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LOCKYER v. ANDRADE: CALIFORNIA
THREE STRIKES LAW SURVIVES
CHALLENGE BASED ON FEDERAL LAW
THAT IS ANYTHING BUT "CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED"
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lockyer v. Andrade, the United States Supreme Court held the
California Court of Appeal did not err in its interpretation of Court
precedent.' That court held that sentencing a convict under the California
three strikes law to fifty years to life in prison for two counts of petty theft
2
was not "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of' Supreme Court
jurisprudence . The defendant, Leandro Andrade, had challenged his
sentence under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.4
This Note examines the opinions in Lockyer and concludes that the law
of the Supreme Court in the area of the Eighth Amendment's application to
a term-of-years sentence was ambiguous at best. This ambiguity led the
Supreme Court to correctly conclude that the California Court of Appeal
did not unreasonably apply Federal law when it reviewed Andrade's Eight
Amendment claim. The majority opinion authored by Justice O'Connor
provides clarity in this area by showing substantial deference to the laws of
the States. Lockyer demonstrates the Court's reluctance to interfere with
States' administration of their criminal justice systems. Additionally, the
majority opinion comports with congressional goals of limiting the abuse of
Federal habeas corpus to review by state prisoners. Justice Souter's
dissenting opinion is mistaken because it relied entirely on only one case.
Moreover, if applied, the dissent's analysis would result in a flood of
538 U.S. 63 (2003).
2 Id. at 77.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2003).
4 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 68.
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prisoner litigation aimed at rendering their sentences null under their
respective State sentencing schemes, and thus does not respect the State's
right to determine its own penological system. Finally, the dissent fails to
recognize that the proper body for changing the California sentencing
scheme is not the Supreme Court, but rather the legislature of the State of
California.
II. BACKGROUND
A. CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES LAW
In June 1992, eighteen-year-old Kimber Reynolds came home to
Fresno for a friend's wedding. Two parolees passed by her riding on a
motorcycle and tried to grab her purse.6 When Kimber fought back, the
driver shot her in the head with a .357 caliber handgun.7 She died two days
later.8 The driver was killed by police in a shootout.9 The accomplice
received a nine year sentence, and was eligible for parole again after he
served half his term.' 0 Kimber's death began a crusade by her father to
strengthen criminal sentencing laws in California, and he authored the
"three strikes" concept."' In April 1993, Reynold's idea received a cold
reception from the California legislature, which killed his bill in
committee. 12 He believed the only way to toughen sentencing was through
submission of a proposition directly to the people of California.' 3 He faced
an uphill battle, with no political support and no money to finance a voter
awareness campaign.14
Later that year twelve-year-old Polly Klaas was kidnapped from her
bedroom in her Petaluma home.' 5 The search for Polly garnered national
media attention and ended with the discovery of her body in December.' 6










15 Polly Klaas Foundation History, at http://www.pollyklaas.org/about/history.shtml (last




The kidnapper, Richard Allen Davis, led police to the body.17  Davis's
record showed chronic disrespect for the law, including multiple
kidnappings, sexual assault, burglary, drug possession, and assault. 8 The
media concentrated on Davis's despicable record as they covered the Klass
story.' 9 Public outrage erupted when Davis's record became known.20
Reynolds was able to tap into that outrage, and a ground swell of public
support for his "three strikes" campaign emerged.2 The legislature passed
the bill, and Governor Pete Wilson signed "three strikes" into law in March
221994. Even though the state had enacted the bill, Reynolds continued to
campaign for the ballot initiative, titled Proposition 184.23 Reynolds
pursued the ratification of Proposition 184 because he wanted to place the
recidivist mechanism beyond legislative amending power.2 4 The ballot
initiative passed in November 1994 garnering seventy-two percent of the
vote.25
Proposition 184 is codified in California Penal Code section 1170.12.26
The sister provision passed by the legislature is California Penal Code
section 667.27 Two primary features to note exist in section 1170.12. First,
subsection 1 170.12(c)(1) mandates a sentence enhancement that doubles the
28punishment for a convicted felon's second felony conviction. 8 Second,
subsection 1170.12(c)(2)(A) requires a felony sentencing court to sentence
defendants that have two or more prior felony convictions to the greater of
(i) three times the mandatory punishment, (ii) twenty-five years, or (iii) a
court imposed term with other appropriate sentence enhancement.29
Effectively, the provision sets a mandatory minimum twenty-five year
sentence for third time felony offenders.30
17 The Criminal Life of Richard Allen Davis, at http://www.justicejunction.com/
judicialinjustice_richardallendean.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
18 Id.
19 See Morain, supra note 5; see also id. (cataloguing Davis's multiple offenses).
20 See Morain, supra note 5.
21 See id.
22 id.
23 Dan Morain & Virginia Ellis, California Elections, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at A3.
24 See Morain, supra note 5.
25 Id.
26 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 1999).
27 Id. § 667.
28 Id. § 1170.12.
29 Id. §§ 1I70.12(c)(2)(A)(i-iii).
30 Id. For a comprehensive exposition on the reasoning behind three strikes, see James
A. Andriaz, California's Three Strikes Law: History, Expectations, Consequences, 32
McGEORGE L. REv. 1 (2000) (outlining the drafters' reasoning in making the law operate).
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The statute operates on past felonies that are "serious" or "violent"
under California law.3' Representative violent felonies include murder,
rape, kidnapping, and felonies committed with a firearm.32 Serious felonies
include such offenses as selling illegal drugs to minors, first degree
burglary, witness intimidation, and armed assault.33 However, subsection
1170.12(c)(2)(A) does not limit the type of felony considered a third
strike.34 The statute specifies only that it governs the term for the current
felony.35 Thus, any felony conviction can trigger application of the three
strike sentence enhancement.36
Other provisions in the statute are designed to ensure its intent to
incarcerate multiple offenders is not frustrated. 37 Several such provisions
are implicated in Andrade's case. 8 For instance, the statute allows all prior
felonies to be counted against a defendant because it has no time limitation
after which a felony could not be used as a potential strike. 39 Also, the
statute mandates consecutive sentencing for felonies not committed on the
same occasion that do not arise from the same operative facts.40 In other
words, a felon with two prior strikes and two current felony counts can face
two separate invocations of the three strikes law at sentencing.41 However,
the statute does not completely remove all sentencing discretion. Indeed,
the statute allows prosecutors to move to dismiss a prior felony conviction
so that it will not be counted as a strike.42 Additionally, the California
Supreme Court granted trial courts the power to dismiss a prior felony from
the strike count sua sponte if dismissal serves the interests of justice.43
31 See Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of California, 270 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2001).
32 See generally § 667.
33 See generally id. § 1192.7. There is some general overlap between "serious" and
"violent" felonies.
34 Id. § 1192.7.
35 Id.
36 See In re Cervera, 16 P.3d 176, 177 (Cal. 2001).
37 See, e.g., § 1170.12(a)(1) (forbidding court limitations on aggregation of consecutive
sentencing for later convictions); § 1170.12(e) (forbidding use of prior felonies in plea
bargaining).
38 See generally Andrade v. Att'y Gen., 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001).
" See § 1170.12(a)(3).
40 Id. § 1170.12(a)(6).
41 Id.; see also People v. Ingram, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 256 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (asserting
each burglary count triggers an application of the three strikes provision).
42 § 1170.12(d)(2).
43 See People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628, 647 (Cal. 1996).
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Application of the California three strikes provision has generated
much wailing and gnashing of academic teeth.44 Many writers take
exception to the application and overall merit of the three strikes law, and
their arguments are not without virtue. For example, the validity of the
statute would be questionable should it fail to reduce crime. 45  The law
should be revamped if it catches and incarcerates criminals as they near the
age when they cease criminal activity. 6 Disproportionate application based
on race also implicates the basic fairness of the statute.47 Economic costs of
increased incarceration may threaten State budget vitality.48
Some statistics, however, demonstrate the success of the law.49
According to a report published in 1999 by Bill Jones, the California
Secretary of State at the time, the four year period following passage of
three strikes saw a massive drop in crime.50 For example, 1994 to 1998
comparisons showed a 51.5% drop in homicide, an 18.7% drop in rape, and
a 48.6% drop in robbery.5' The report pegs societal economic saving from
crime reduction over the same period to be between $8.2 billion and $21.7
billion.52 These statistics, while compelling, are not immune to criticism,
primarily driven by the notion that the strong economy affected crime in
that time period. 3
B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE
The Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of "cruel and unusual
punishment. ' 54 Three areas of jurisprudence have evolved in cases dealing
44 See, e.g., Keith C. Owens, California's "Three Strikes" Debacle: A Volatile Mixture
of Fear, Vengeance, and Demagoguery Will Unravel the Criminal Justice System and Bring
California to Its Knees, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 129 (1995); Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can
We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395 (1997).
45 See Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure of California's "Three
Strikes and You're Out" Law, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 65, 66 (1999).
46 Id. at 65.
47 See, e.g., Autumn McCullogh, Comment, Three Strikes and You're In (For Life): An
Analysis of the California Three Strikes Law as Applied to Convictions for Misdemeanor
Conduct, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 277, 278 (2002).
48 See, e.g., J. Harry Jones, Funds Asked for in Jail Construction, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., Oct. 16, 1996, at A4.
49 See generally Bill Jones, Why the Three Strikes Law Is Working in California, 11
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 23 (1999).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Bill Jones, Three Strikes and You're Out Five Years Later, available at
http://www.threestrikes.org/bjones98pgthree.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
13 See, e.g., Vitiello, supra note 44.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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with what is cruel and unusual punishment. First, the Eighth Amendment
forbids punishment in some instances. 55 Second, the Eighth Amendment
restricts the use of certain kinds of punishment.5 6  Finally, the Eighth
Amendment contains a requirement that punishment imposed not be grossly
disproportionate to the crime committed.5
The text of the Eighth Amendment comes verbatim from the English
Bill of Rights. 8 The first Congress adopted the Eighth Amendment as part
of the Bill of Rights, including the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause,
in 1791. 9 Most of the early commentaries surrounding the clause, and state
court decisions interpreting their constitutions' respective similar clauses,
indicate it forbade the imposition of certain types of punishment.6 °
Much debate exists over whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment applies to prison terms. 61  The
proportionality principle asserts that a term-of-years punishment may not be
grossly disproportionate to the underlying offense.62 In other words, the
proportionality principle assesses "the relationship between the nature and
number of offenses committed and the severity of the punishment
imposed., 63  The concept of proportionality entered Eighth Amendment
Supreme Court jurisprudence in a dissent by Justice Field in O'Neil v.
Vermont.64 Twelve years later, the Court overturned the conviction of an
American coast guardsman that resulted in a sentence of fifteen years at
hard labor in chains, and a fine.65 Weems was convicted in a Philippine
5 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that incarcerating drug
addicts violates the Eighth Amendment).
56 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (prohibiting capital punishment for
rape).
57 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72-73 (2003). But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 966 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
58 See ROBERT RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 9 (1991).
59 Id. at 215.
60 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 981-85 (Scalia, J., concurring).
61 See, e.g., id.
62 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
63 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
64 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892). O'Neil, a New York liquor wholesaler, was convicted of
numerous violations of Vermont's prohibition laws because he sent orders into the state
C.O.D. Id. at 327. He was fined and sentenced to jail time. Id. at 330-31. If he could not
pay his fine, his jail time would equal fifty-four years. Id. 331. The Court did not reach the
question of proportionality of the sentence because O'Neil did not include that point in his
assignment of errors or brief. Id. After comparing the punishment to that possible of other
crimes committed in the jurisdiction, Justice Story took exception to the sentence and
declared it inhumane because it sprang from aggregation of individual offenses. Id. at 339-
40.
65 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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court of falsifying a document in the Philippine jurisdiction, which at the
time was an American administered territory.66 The Philippine court relied
on Spanish law, which did not require a mens rea, when it convicted
Weems.67 It also based Weems' sentence on Spanish law.68 The Court
compared the sentence to those available under United States law for
similar offenses, and then noted that more serious offenses in the
Philippines carried the same punishment as imposed in the instant case,
before holding the punishment was disproportionate to the crime.
69
More recently, the Supreme Court has entertained challenges to state
criminal laws that impose lengthy term-of-years punishment for nonviolent
felonies. One of these statutes was held unconstitutional based on the
theory that it violated the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principal.7 °
The line of cases dealing with the proportionality of state recidivist
sentencing requirements began in 1980 with Rummel v. Estelle.71  In
Rummel,72 the Court held that a life sentence for a third nonviolent felony
conviction mandated by a Texas recidivist statute did not violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment when applied to
the defendant.73 The defendant's third conviction was a theft offense for
$120.75. 74 His two prior offenses were both theft related nonviolent
felonies; the first for fraudulent use of a credit card for eighty dollars, and
the second for writing a $28.36 bad check.75 Writing for the majority,
Justice Rehnquist noted that most of the successful proportionality
challenges to state punishment schemes came to the court in the context of
death penalty cases.76 Rehnquist then divided proportionality challenges of
death penalty statutes from challenges of statutes that impose a term-of-
years punishment.77  He differentiated Weems based on that Court's
references to accompaniments (hard labor, chains) to the length of the
sentence.78 Finally, Rehnquist asserted that because the defendant's
66 Id. at 357.
67 Id. at 363.
68 Id. at 363-64.
69 Id. at 380-81.
70 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
"' 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
72 Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun, White, and Stewart joined Justice Rehnquist
in the majority.
73 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265.
74 Id. at 266.
71 Id. at 265.
76 Id. at 272.
77 Id.
71 Id. at 273-74.
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convictions were for felonies, the state legislature had the power to
determine the proper term-of-years sentence as punishment.79 However,
Rehnquist recognized the possibility of invalidating punishment based on a
state statute if the statute mandated extreme punishment for a trivial
offense, such as life in prison for overtime parking violations.80
Dissenting in Rummel,8 1 Justice Powell argued that the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment commands
proportionality analysis not only in the context of death penalty cases but
also for sentences imposing a term-of-years punishment. 82 He understood
the difficulty present in subjecting state sentencing schemes to the review of
federal judges. 83 So Powell attempted to distill three criteria utilized in
other Supreme Court cases. 84  The proffered criteria for judging state
sentences under a proportionality analysis were: first, to examine the nature
of the crime; second, to compare the punishment imposed with similar
sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime; and third,
compare the punishment with punishments for other crimes in the same
jurisdiction.8 5 Justice Powell applied this test and concluded that a sentence
of life in prison for three theft felonies constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.8 6 Thus, Powell asserted, the sentence should be overturned.
The Court reaffirmed its stance on subjecting state based sentences to
proportionality analysis two years later in a per curiam decision. 88 The
defendant in Hutto v. Davis was sentenced to twenty years incarceration for
conviction in Virginia on two counts of possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute. 89 The district court, using factors similar to those announced
by Justice Powell in his dissent in Rummel, ignored the Court's majority
opinion, and granted the respondent's habeas petition.90 A panel of the
Fourth Circuit overturned the ruling, but reaffirmed the district court after
hearing the case en banc.9' The Supreme Court vacated the decision and
remanded it to the Fourth Circuit to be reconsidered because of the Rummel
'9 Id. at 274.8 Id. at 274 n. 11.
81 Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall joined Justice Powell in his dissent.
82 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
83 See id. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting).
14 See id. at 295-302 (Powell, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 302 (Powell, J., dissenting).
86 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
87 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
88 See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).





decision, but the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its prior ruling.92 In its per
curiam decision, the Court reiterated its reasoning from Rummel, and then
lambasted the Fourth Circuit for ignoring the hierarchy of the federal
courts.93 Interestingly, Justice Powell concurred with the Court's judgment,
based on its similarity to the facts of Rummel.
94
One year later, in Solem v. Helm, 95 Justice Powell delivered an opinion
that the defendant's sentence violated the proportionality principle. 96 The
defendant had been sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole
in South Dakota for writing a bad check for less than one hundred dollars.
97
The defendant had previously been convicted of six nonviolent felonies,
and qualified for sentencing under South Dakota's recidivist statute.98 In
distinguishing the instant case from Rummel, Powell emphasized that the
petitioner in Rummel had the possibility of being paroled, whereas in South
Dakota the recidivist statute forbade parole.99 He then applied the three
prong test laid out in his dissent in Rummel. 0 0 Based on the application of
these criteria to the respondent's case, a five member majority affirmed the
decision of the Eighth Circuit to overturn the sentence. l0 1 However, the
Court did not expressly overrule Rummel. In fact, the majority stated that
Rummel remained good law.'
0 2
Chief Justice Burger argued in dissent that the majority both
disregarded Rummel'0 3 and states' rights, distorting the proportionality
principle as applied to a term-of-years sentence.'0 4 He questioned the
objectivity of the standards applied by the majority and asserted that the




13 Id. at 373-75.
94 Id. at 375.
95 Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Stevens, and Marshall joined Justice Powell in the
majority.
96 See 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
17 Id. at 281.
98 Id. at 280-81.
99 Id. at 283-84.
1oo Id. at 296-300; see supra text accompanying note 83.
'o' Id. at 303.
102 Id. at 288 n.13, 303 n.32.
103 Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined the Chief Justice in his dissent.
"o Solem, 463 U.S. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 314 (Burger, C.J, dissenting).
20041
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Eight years later, the Court confronted a Michigan law that mandated
sentencing a cocaine dealer to life in prison without possibility of parole.
0 6
The defendant challenged the imposition of a life sentence without
possibility of parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine as
disproportionate to crime. 0 7 Five Justices agreed to uphold the validity of
the sentence. 0 8 However, the majority disagreed as to whether the Eighth
Amendment's proportionality rule could be used to strike down a term-of-
years sentence.1 9  Writing for the plurality, Justice Kennedy found
precedential support for the proportionality principle in the previous line of
cases, but determined that the structure of the principle was unclear." 0
Justice Kennedy derived four principles from precedent to provide some
structure for the proportionality principle."'
First, Justice Kennedy asserted that legislatures are in a better position
to judge the quality of penal law." 2 Therefore, any review process must
provide substantial deference to legislative prerogative in deciding if a
sentence violates the proportionality principle." 3 Second, he wrote that the
Eighth Amendment does not require uniformity in sentencing, and that
historically the schemes and goals of state penological systems have
varied. 1 "4 Third, he argued that changes and variety in penological theory
are the result of our federal structure of government. 1 5 Since these systems
are so varied, often reflecting societal needs and preferences, state by state
comparison is exceedingly difficult." 6 Thus, simply because a single state
has the harshest mandatory sentence for a crime, that state's status as an
outlier on that issue does not necessarily invalidate that sentence. Finally,
given the preceding principles, Justice Kennedy stated that any review must
be based on objective factors, and prior cases failed to adequately provide
an objective test for proportionality." 7
106 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
' Id. at 961.
108 Id. (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
agreed the sentence was not unconstitutional).
'09 Id. at 965, 996. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, advocated
overturning Solem. Id. at 996. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter,
counseled recognizing a proportionality principal based on stare decisis. Id.




114 Id. at 999.
15 Id.
116 Id. at 1000.
"' Id. at 1000-01.
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Justice Kennedy then reshaped the test set out by Justice Powell in his
dissent in Rummel and the opinion in Solem. First, he performed a
threshold analysis by examining the severity of the crime underlying the
sentence and comparing it to the sentence, and found the situation
harmonious with Hutto.' 8 Second, he folded Powell's inter- and intra-
jurisdictional analysis together, and suggested that such comparisons should
be utilized only after a threshold examination of the crime and sentence
yielded an inference of disproportionality.1 9 On the facts at hand, he saw
no disproportionality and thus did not perform further inquiry. 2°
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, examined Eighth Amendment
history and concluded that proportionality analysis did not include an
examination of a term-of-years sentence.' 2' Justice White authored a
dissent highly critical of both Scalia and Kennedy.' 22 He asserted that
Justice Scalia's historical analysis is inconclusive at best, and therefore the
Court should use the lack of historical clarity to find a proportionality
principal in the Eighth Amendment.123 White also attacked Kennedy's
opinion for eviscerating the Solem test. 24 He contended that comparative
analysis is a cornerstone of Eighth Amendment decision-making, and that
relegating comparative analysis to the second tier ensures an inherently
subjective analysis of any sentence.125 After performing the Solem test,
White found the sentence, and therefore the Michigan law,
unconstitutional. 
26
C. HABEAS CORPUS AND THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
The Founders viewed the write of habeas corpus, often termed the
Great Writ, to be a cornerstone among the tools that secure citizens' liberty
interests. The writ of habeas corpus, often termed the Great Writ, was
viewed by the Founders as a cornerstone among the tools that secure the
liberty of citizens.' 7 The writ traces its roots in English history, where it
8 Id. at 1002-04.
'i9 Id. at 1005.
120 Id.
12, Id. at 965.
122 Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined Justice White in his dissent. Justice Marshall
dissented separately.
123 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1010 (White, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 1019 (White, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 1020-21 (White, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 1027 (White, J., dissenting).
127 See RUTLAND, supra note 58, at 4-5.
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was developed as an order to compel a person's appearance before a
court.1 28 The Founders saw fit to ensconce the writ in American law by
protecting it from suspension except in extreme cases. 129 The Constitution
provides that "[t]he Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it."' 30 The first Congress codified the right to the writ in the
Judiciary Act of 1789. At the end of the Civil War, the power of the writ
was extended to state courts to ensure protection of the rights of the newly
freed slaves in the South.
131
The next major development in habeas occurred almost a century later.
In Brown v. Allen, the Supreme Court held that criminals in state custody
who had been convicted of a state offense were permitted to allege that they
were being held in violation of federal law. 132 The Court ruled habeas
corpus could be used as the vehicle to have those claims heard in federal
district court. 13 3  Previously, review of state prisoner claims had been
limited to direct review by the Supreme Court.' 34 Another seminal case,
Fay v. Noia, held that federal issues did not have to be raised in state court
in order to be cognizable in a federal habeas petition.' 35 In Townsend v.
Sain, the Court gave state prisoners a right to an evidentiary hearing on
constitutional claims in federal court. 136 In Sanders v. United States, the
Court ruled that a prisoner could submit successive petitions, as long as the
petition raised a new claim unknown to the defendant's counsel at the time
a prior petition was filed. 137  Little or no concern for state procedures,
interests or comity between the systems entered into these decisions.1
38
The Court became more cognizant of states' interests in the criminal
process as the configuration of the Court changed. 139  The Burger and
128 Id. at 5.
129 See WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WAR TIME 36
(2000).
130 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
131 See id.
132 344 U.S. 443 (1953); H.R. REP. No. 103-470, at 2 (1994) (recognizing the Brown
decision's role in formulating habeas as a vehicle to review State criminal proceedings for
Federal constitutional violations).
133 See Marshall Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism
After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
337, 342 (1997).
134 See H.R. REP. No. 103-470, at 2.
13' 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
136 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
137 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
138 See Hartman & Nyden, supra note 133, at 340.
139 See id. at 342-51.
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Rehnquist courts sought to check the ease by which state prisoners could
use the writ by imposing exhaustion requirements, 40 limiting a prisoner's
ability to make successive claims, 141 and disallowing retroactive application
of new constitutional rules.142 These changes reflect the belief that the state
and federal court systems should be utilized to generate synergies. 43 The
Warren court era habeas jurisprudence had resulted in an inefficient use of
judicial resources.44 Additionally, the Court came to recognize the State
interest in finality of adjudication of its criminal matters. 45 Finally, modem
State courts could be trusted to respect the rights of unprotected minority
groups. 1
46
The twists and turns of forty years of habeas corpus rulings led to an
inevitable result: a complicated morass of procedural rules threaded with
exceptions that became unwieldy to exercise and adjudicate. 47 The costs
arising from this convolution of law, including federal court time and effort,
delay of claim resolution, and friction with state systems, did not escape
Congressional notice. 48 Habeas reform became a major part of the political
landscape during the 1994 Congressional races. 49 After the Republicans
won control of the House and Senate in 1994, the legislative reforms moved
forward. In Senate hearings, Senator Hatch enumerated the reasons for
reform. First, delays between sentencing and resolution of the lawfulness
of the sentence had detrimental effects by undermining public confidence in
the criminal justice system, blurring the roles of the federal and state courts,
and hampering the execution of justice without reciprocal improvements in
140 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (holding that state claimants must show
cause as to why their federal claims were never raised in state court direct review and
demonstrate actual prejudice from denial of that claim).
141 See McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (holding that state claimants must show
cause as to why the additional federal claims were never raised in the first petition and
demonstrate actual prejudice from denial of those rights).
142 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (noting that new constitutional rules are not
retroactive unless they involve a fundamental right).
143 See William Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Conference on State-Federal
Judicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REv. 1657 (1992).
144 See id.
145 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (noting that the Fay concept of
federal/state relations undervalued state procedural rules).
146 Steven Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1057, 1077 (2002).
147 See Barry Freidman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83
CAL. L. REv. 485, 530 (1995).
148 See H. R. REP. No. 103-470, at 3 (1994).
149 See Taking Back Our Streets Act in the Contract with America, at
http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/safetyd.txt (last visited Nov. 30, 2003).
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the quality of the adjudication. 150 Second, lawfully convicted prisoners
abused the writ, undermining public confidence, draining state resources,
and causing additional emotional damage to victims' families.151  These
political sentiments were a catalyzing force behind the development of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
The structure of the habeas reform codified in the AEDPA was birthed
out of the recommendations of a committee of federal judges. 52  Chief
Justice Rehnquist commissioned the Committee to make legislative
recommendations to address delays faced by States in carrying out death
penalty sentences.1 53 The Committee, chaired by retired Justice Powell,
concluded that delays that occurred under the present regime of habeas law
did not add to the fairness of the process. 54  Prisoners were bounced
between the state and federal court systems during their collateral
reviews. 1 Moreover, because prisoners were not limited in the number of
habeas claims they could bring, they were able to file claims piecemeal in
order to stretch out the process. 156
The Committee proposed a solution that would be optional for the
states to participate in.157 The states could receive the benefits of the statute
if they decided to provide competent council to capital defendants
throughout the appeals process.15 8 The reform was fairly simple: federal
habeas claims must be filed within six months of the conclusion of direct
review,1 59 the defendant must exhaust all state court appeals before applying
for federal relief,160 and the claimant receives an automatic stay while the
habeas issues are being resolved.' 61  Under this scheme, absent
extraordinary circumstances, the defendant would only get one bite at the
habeas apple.
15o Federal Habeas Corpus Reform: Eliminating Prisoner's Abuse of the Judicial
Process: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) [hereinafter
Senate Habeas Hearing] (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chair, Comm. on the Judiciary).
'5' Id. at 2.
152 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-470.
153 Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 CRIM. L. REP. 3239 (1989)




IS7 Id. at 3240.
158 Id.
159 Id.




The suggestions of the Powell Committee became the bedrock of the
reform efforts after the Republicans gained majorities in both the House and
Senate in the 1994 election cycle.' 62 A few changes had been made to the
original suggestion. First, the statute of limitations for filing a claim had
been extended from six months to one year.' 63 Second, and more important
to the substance of the reform, the new effort had decided to codify the
standard of review to be applied by the federal courts when reviewing
habeas petitions. 164 Congress was poised to require federal courts to defer
to state court unless their judgments were "contrary to" or an "unreasonable
application of' Supreme Court precedent, instead of making a de novo
assessment of a habeas petitioner's claims. 65 The addition of this language
marks congressional codification of deference accorded to states as co-
interpreters of constitutional law.
166
Consideration of the bill began in earnest in the wake of the Oklahoma
City bombing. 67  The terrorist attack, combined with the Republican
majority and a President anxious to be seen fighting terrorism, formed a
"perfect storm" for passage of provisions significantly altering, and
tightening up, federal habeas relief'168 President Clinton signed the AEDPA
into law on April 24, 1996.169 He insisted that the standard of review
language was not an abrogation of the responsibility of federal courts to
apply their own analysis to state criminal cases. 70 The President was partly
correct in his assessment of the Act's requirements of federal judges.
Federal judges still review state court decisions, but now the focus shifted
to the state court's opinion rather than the claims of the habeas petitioner. 17
Commentators were initially unsure of the extent of the AEDPA's
reach. 172 In Williams v. Taylor, the Court interpreted the new standard of
162 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-23 (1995).
163 H.R. REP. No 104-23, at 5.
164 See Senate Habeas Hearing, supra note 150, at 32 (statement of Daniel Lungren, Cal.
Att'y Gen.). The new standard of review limited a federal court's habeas inquiry to whether
the state court "unreasonably applied" Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 123.
165 Panel Discussion: Dead Man Walking without Due Process? A Discussion of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
163, 171 (1997) [hereinafter A.B.A. Panel] (remarks of Professor Leon Friedman).
166 See Senate Habeas Hearing, supra note 150, at 59 (statement of Gail Norton, Col.
Att'y Gen.); see generally Rehnquist, supra note 143.
167 See Bryan Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in
Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 701 (2002).
168 See id.
169 U.S. Code Congressional & Admin. News 961-1 (1996).
170 Id. at 961-3.
171 See generally A.B.A Panel, supra note 165.
172 See generally id.
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review codified in the AEDPA.'7 3 Writing for the majority on the issue of
the statutory interpretation of the standard of review, Justice O'Conner
defined both the "contrary to" and the "unreasonable application of'
components of the new standard. 174 First, she defined "contrary to" as a
state court decision that is "substantially different" from Supreme Court
precedent.175 Two instances appear in which a state court may run afoul of
the "contrary to" provision of the Act. 176 The state court could apply a rule
of law that conflicts with Supreme Court precedent, or the state court could
apply the correct rule to a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable
from a Supreme Court decision and get a result opposite the Court's
ruling.
177
Second, O'Conner laid out the process for determining when a state
court decision could be an "unreasonable application of' the appropriate
Supreme Court precedent. 78  She conclusively rejected the "reasonable
jurist" standard as too subjective, and opted instead to direct the federal
inquiry to determine if the application of precedent was "objectively
unreasonable."' 179 She specifically forbade the federal jurist from applying
his or her own independent judgment to the habeas claim, and then turning
to the state court judge's application of the law and simply saying the state
court judge was wrong. 180 The federal judge must determine that in getting
the application wrong, the state court judge's application of that law was
"objectively unreasonable."'' 81 Thus, federal judges must now assess state
court judgments as co-equal in their interpretation and application of federal
constitutional law when deciding a habeas case. 82
529 U.S. 362 (2000).
'7I Id. at 405-11.
'7 Id. at 405.
176 id.
177 id.
178 Id. at 409.
179 id.
18 Id. at 411.
181 Id.
182 See id.; Jordan Steiker, Did the Oklahoma City Bombers Succeed?, 574 ANNALS 185,
186 (2001); see generally Sandra Day O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 1 (1984-85); Rehnquist, supra note 143.
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III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTS
On November 4, 1995, Leandro Andrade entered a Kmart in Ontario,
California.1 83 He walked over to the electronics section, looked around,
picked up some videotapes, and put them in his pants. 184 The videotapes he
had selected were children's movies (Snow White, Casper, The Fox and the
Hound, The Pebble and the Penguin, and Batman Forever) with a total
value of $84.70.185 Andrade left the Kmart without paying for the
videotapes and loss prevention personnel from the store apprehended him in
the store parking lot, took the videotapes away, and had Andrade arrested
for shoplifting. 
8 6
Exactly two weeks later, on November 18, 1995, Andrade entered a
Kmart in Montclair, California.187  After walking over to the electronics
section, he selected some videotapes and put them down his pants. 8 8 Once
again, Andrade selected children's movies (Free Willy 2, Cinderella, Santa
Clause, and Little Women) with a total value of $68.84.189 He left the store
without paying for the videotapes; loss prevention stopped him in the
parking lot, recovered the merchandise, and held him until the police
arrived to arrest him for shoplifting.' 90  Andrade, in his statement to
authorities, admitted to stealing the videos and asserted his theft was
motivated by a heroin addiction that had plagued him since 1977.' 9'
Leandro Andrade is a U.S. Army veteran and father of three
children.' 92 At the time these shoplifting incidents occurred, Andrade was
addicted to heroin, unmarried, unemployed, and did not help support his
children.' 9  His criminal career had spanned more than a decade.
Andrade's first conviction came in January 1982, when he was sentenced to
six days in jail with twelve months probation for misdemeanor theft. 94 A
little more than a year later, he pled guilty to three counts of residential
183 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003).
184 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
185 Brief of Respondent at 1, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
186 Id.; Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
187 Brief of Respondent at 1, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
188 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2-3, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
189 Brief of Respondent at 1, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
190 Joint Appendix at 25, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 27, 32.
193 Id.
194 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66.
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burglary, and was sentenced to 120 months in prison.1 95 These charges are
viewed as "serious or violent" felonies under California law. 196 In 1988,
Andrade was convicted in Federal court for transporting marijuana, a felony
charge that earned him an eight year sentence.' 97 In March 1990, he was
convicted of petty theft in California state court and sentenced to six
months in jail. 198 Later that year he was again convicted of transportation
of marijuana in Federal court where he remained until September 1991-
when he violated his state parole by attempting to escape from prison. 199
Andrade was paroled from the state prison system in February 1993.200
The San Bernardino County District Attorney filed an information on
January 19, 1996, charging Andrade with petty theft with a prior
conviction, bringing the charge under the purview of California Penal Code
section 666.201 The charge included allegations about the first shoplifting
incident and Andrade's prior convictions for residential burglary.20 2 On
March 13, 1996, the court granted the prosecutor's motion to consolidate
the case with the second shoplifting offense, tacking on a second charge of
petty theft with a prior conviction.
203
On March 27, 1996 a jury convicted Andrade of two unrelated counts
of petty theft with a prior conviction. 20 4 His 1990 conviction for petty theft
operated to place the two shoplifting charges under section 666 of the
California Penal Code.20 5  That statute provides that a subsequent
conviction for petty theft following a prior like conviction can be charged as
a felony, making the new charges "wobble" between misdemeanor and
felony status. 206 The prosecutor chose to charge these "wobblers," the two
new shoplifting offenses, as felonies.20 7 Once the thefts were charged as
felonies, the probation officer was bound by law to recommend the harshest
possible punishment allowed by the law-twenty-five years to life for each
195 Id.
196 Joint Appendix at 4, Lockyer (No. 01-1127); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West
Supp. 2004) (burglary of a residence defined as a "serious" felony).
197 Joint Appendix at 4, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
198 Id.
'99 Id. at 24-25.
200 Id. at 25.
201 Brief of Respondent at 2, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Joint Appendix at 34, Lockyer (No. 01-1127); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a)(6)
(West 1999).
205 Joint Appendix at 34, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
206 CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West Supp. 2004).
207 See Joint Appendix at 34, Lockyer (No. 01-1127); § 666.
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count-because it was Andrade's third and fourth offenses.2 °8  The jury
made the required special finding that Andrade had been convicted of two
or more serious felonies in California (the 1982 burglary convictions),
which opened the way for application of the three strikes law. 20 9 Because
each of the felony theft counts triggered separate application of the three
strikes law, the judge was allowed to sentence Andrade to fifty years to
life.21
0
On May 13, 1997, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Andrade's
conviction on direct appeal, rejecting Andrade's claim that his sentence
violated the proportionality provision of the Eighth Amendment. 211 The
Court of Appeal found the validity of Solem's proportionality analysis
doubtful in light of Harmelin, the most recent pronouncement of the Court
on the subject of proportionality.2 1 2 The Court of Appeal then assessed
Andrade's case in light of the ruling in Rummel.213  The state court
concluded that Andrade's criminal history was no less serious than those
committed by the defendant in Rummel, and thus his sentence was not
disproportionate. 21 4 Finally, the Court of Appeal applied the California
version of proportionality analysis that mirrors the Solem test. 21 5  Even
under the state version of the Solem proportionality analysis, the state court
concluded Andrade's sentence was proportional to the underlying crime.21 6
The California Supreme Court denied petition for certiorari.21 7
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION
On August 19, 1998, Andrade filed for federal habeas relief in the
Central District of California. 21 8 The petition was dismissed by the district
court on February 18, 1999.219 In August 1999, the Ninth Circuit granted
Andrade leave to appeal.220 On November 2, 2001, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the judgment of the district court, granted a writ of habeas corpus
208 Joint Appendix at 27-28, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
209 Lockyer, 583 U.S. at 68; see § 1170.12(a).
210 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 68.
211 Id. at 68-69.
212 Id. at 69-70.
213 People v. Andrade, No. FWV08781 (Cal. App. 1997), available at Joint Appendix at
76, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
214 Id. at 77.
215 See id. at 77-78.
216 See id. at 78.
217 Joint Appendix at 1, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of California, 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001).
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on behalf of Andrade, and remanded the case to state court for re-
sentencing.22'
The Ninth Circuit adopted the proportionality reasoning proffered by
Justice Kennedy in Harmelin at the beginning of its analysis of the habeas
222petition. The court concluded that Harmelin meant that Solem's second
and third factors, intra-jurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional comparisons,
need not be applied unless a defendant's sentence raises an inference of
gross disproportionality.2 23 First, the court examined the harshness of the
penalty and the gravity of the theft offense.224 The court found that
Andrade's mandatory minimum fifty year sentence will result in him
spending most of his life in prison, and thus the case comported more with
the facts of Solem than those of Rummel. 225 Next, the court noted under
California law petty theft is usually a misdemeanor, and a construction of
California law accelerated the misdemeanor petty theft charges to felonies
eligible for strike count. 6 Additionally, the court observed the prior felony
strikes and concluded the absence of violence likened the case to Solem.
227
Finally, the court ruled that the length of the sentence coupled with the lack
of seriousness of the crimes created an inference of gross
disproportionality.22 8
After determining the threshold from Harmelin had been met, the court
applied the second and third prongs of the Solem test. 229 The court found
Andrade's sentence to be disproportionate when compared to mandatory
minimum sentences for a two-time petty theft offender and a violent first
time offender. Next, the court found Andrade's sentence to be
disproportionate to possible punishment in other jurisdictions that have
similar recidivist statutes.23' On these grounds, the court concluded
Andrade's sentence was grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.232
221 Id. at 767.
222 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 754 (recognizing that this Circuit and others have adopted "the
rule of Harmelin").
223 Id. at 758.
224 Id. at 758-61.
225 Id. at 758-59.
226 Id. at 759-60.
227 Id. at 760-61.
221 Id. at 761.
229 Id. at 761-66.
230 Id. at 761-62.
231 Id. at 762-66.
232 Id. at 766.
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The Court then asserted the California Court of Appeal unreasonably
applied Supreme Court law when it determined Harmelin created a question
about Solem's validity and relied exclusively on Rummel for its
proportionality analysis.233 The court admitted Andrade's case is similar to
both Rummel and Solem, but found that Solem should have been
controlling. 234 Equating Andrade's minimum fifty year sentence to the life
sentence overturned in Solem, the court granted Andrade's habeas
petition.235 The Supreme Court granted cert to the State of California in
2002 to decide whether the Ninth Circuit's grant of Andrade's habeas
petition was proper.236
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,237 Justice O'Connor held Andrade's sentence
did not violate the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle.2 38 The
State argued that the California Court of Appeal's reliance on Rummel was
neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.239
Andrade argued his consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life for
shoplifting violated the Eighth Amendment. 240  The majority rejected
Andrade's habeas claim.24' In doing so, the Court then overruled the Ninth
Circuit's review of the state court and its application of Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis to Leandro Andrade's sentence.242
The Court refused to reach the merits of the state court decision, and
instead evaluated the state court's decision under the AEDPA's standard of
review. 243 First, the Court determined the appropriate law to apply to a




236 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S 63 (2003).
237 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy joined O'Connor.
238 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 70-72.
241 Id. at 71.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 71. When entertaining a habeas petition, the reviewing federal court only
determines if the state court ruling was "contrary to, or an involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2003).
244 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72.
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refers to Supreme Court holdings, and not dicta, in effect at the time the
state court makes its decision.245 The Court's Eighth Amendment cases do
hold that a proportionality principle is applicable to a term-of-years
sentence.6 But the holdings that derive a proportionality principle from
the Eighth Amendment are unclear in their application of that principle.
247
Indeed, the Court has not established a consistent path for courts to follow
on when to apply the proportionality principle. 248 While the contours of the
principle are unclear, precedent dictates that application of the principle will
be rare; it will only be applied in extreme cases.2 49
Next, the Court proceeded to recite situations in which a state court
ruling is "contrary to" federal law, and evaluated whether the California
court's ruling was contrary to the law.250 The Court explained that a state
court ruling is "contrary to" precedent if the state court applies a legal rule
opposite to governing precedent, or a state court confronts a fact pattern that
is indistinguishable from a precedent case yet yields a result different from
the precedent.25 1 In Andrade's case, the factual situation implicated factors
present in both Rummel and Solem,252 yet was distinguishable from both
those cases. 3 Because both cases remain good law, the California court
could not reach a result "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent in following
either one. 54 Additionally, because Andrade's facts were sufficiently
distinguishable from both cases, the California court was not bound to one
specific precedent case. 55 Thus, the California court ruling was not
"contrary to" precedent because it chose to rely on the Court's holding in
Rummel.256
Finally, the Court evaluated the conditions under which a state court
makes an "unreasonable application of' a precedential rule to a new factual
situation. The Court stated that in order to overturn a state court
application of a federal rule, that court's application of the rule must have
245 Id. at 71-72.
246 Id. at 72.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id, at 73.
250 Id.





256 Id. at 73-74.
257 Id. at 75.
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been "objectively unreasonable. 58 Thus, the Ninth Circuit erred when it
applied a "clear error" standard to its evaluation of the state court decision,
because clear error fails to give proper deference to the state decision.259
The Court said that the proper standard to apply is the "objectively
unreasonable" standard. 260 This standard allows a federal habeas court to
grant relief if the state court misapplies federal law to a new set of facts. 6
But the rule for applying the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle
is unclear.262 This lack of clarity provides for substantial deference to
legislatures as they attempt to fashion sentences that fit within the rubric of
the proportionality principle.263  Therefore, the California court's
affirmation of Andrade's sentence was not "objectively unreasonably"
because the Supreme Court had not substantially defined the proportionality
rule.264 Instead, the California court reasonably assumed that the Supreme
Court had crafted a rule that granted substantial deference to the state
sovereignty in the development of their penological systems.265
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S DISSENTING OPINION
Writing in dissent,2 66 Justice Souter proffered two reasons why the
California Court of Appeal holding was unreasonable.267 First, Souter
contended that because Solem was the Court's most recent decision dealing
with recidivist statutes, it was controlling.268 He argued that Solem
established the benchmark for applying the proportionality principle and
distinguished it from Rummel because the defendant in Rummel had been
available for parole after only twelve years of his life sentence.2 69 Souter
asserted that Andrade's facts resembled the facts from Solem, specifically
the non-violent nature of their respective felonies.27 °  Souter found
additionally that the consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life









266 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Souter.
267 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., dissenting).
268 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).269 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
270 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Solem. 271  He noted that the only way to distinguish between Andrade's
facts and the facts in Solem was that Andrade faced a possibility of parole in
his fifty year sentence, while the respondent in Solem faced a mandatory
life sentence.272
Next, Souter contended that the challenge in the instant case was not to
the sentence as a whole, but only to the second sentence of twenty-five
years to life for the second shoplifting incident.273 Souter reasoned that
since the legislature's goal was essentially to incarcerate a repeat offender
because of the danger he posed to society, and the state had chosen twenty-
five years to life as the appropriate sentence to accomplish that goal,
double-counting the second offense violated the state's own penalogical
theory.274 Moreover, the California Court of Appeal offered no justification
for allowing the double counting of Andrade's second shoplifting offense
when it reviewed his gross disporportionality claim. 275 Souter assumed that
the theory underlying double-counting Andrade's second offense would be
the same as the first: continued danger to the public.276 He rejected this
notion, asserting that basing two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years
to life on that penalogical theory is not seriously debatable among
reasonable minds.2 77 Thus, the second sentence was unreasonable under the
federal statute.278
V. ANALYSIS
The Court correctly held that the California Court of Appeal decision
affirming Andrade's term-of-years sentence did not violate the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. First, while a
proportionality principle exists in the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, its application has been disjointed and ambiguous, leaving
much room for states to exercise discretion. Given the ambiguity in this
area of constitutional law, any question about its application should be
resolved in favor of the states. Since the California Court of Appeal was
within the auspices of precedent in upholding Andrade's sentence, the
Court's opinion was correct.
271 Id. at 79 (Souter, J., dissenting).272 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
272 Id. at 79-80 (Souter, J., dissenting).
274 Id. at 80-82 (Souter, J., dissenting).
275 Id. at 82 (Souter, J., dissenting).
276 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
277 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
278 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Second, though a proportionality principle operating on a term-of-
years sentence is recognized in the Eighth Amendment, that principle
should in no way be utilized as a vehicle to undermine the rights of States to
develop penalogical systems that fit the needs of the day. A beneficial
aspect of federalism is the ability of States to experiment with their criminal
justice systems to find an efficient pattern. California's three strikes law has
faced much criticism, and Andrade's sentence may not seem to make good
sense, but some evidence indicates the law is having a beneficial effect.
Further, the people of California are capable of adjusting the statutory
scheme.
Finally, modem Supreme Court jurisprudence has moved toward
recognizing state courts as co-equal interpreters of constitutional criminal
law. Moreover, the framers of the AEDPA's habeas provision constructed
the reform to curtail federal intrusion into State criminal systems. The
Court correctly followed modem constitutional doctrine and congressional
intent when it directed the Ninth Circuit to grant substantial deference to the
State of California. Thus the Rehnquist Court, with the statutory authority
granted by Congress, has fully come to realize its ideological prerogative
that state courts are co-equal with their federal counterparts in constitutional
interpretation.
A. THE AMBIGUITY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE IN
PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS GRANTED LEEWAY TO THE
CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL TO UPHOLD ANDRADE'S
SENTENCE
The Lockyer Court faced a situation in which a federal court reversed a
state court's decision about a state mandated criminal sentence. 279 The state
court based its decision to uphold Andrade's sentence on viable Supreme
Court precedent by analyzing it under Rummel. 280 Then the state court's
effort was supplanted by two judges on the Ninth Circuit who wanted the
state court to follow Solem, the other case that could have governed the
analysis. 28' However, the Court had already announced a principle that
state court decisions deserve respect when they are based on existing law
and made in good faith.282  Additionally, Justice Kennedy's attempt in
Harmelin to reconcile the two different analytic structures in Rummel and
Solem had significantly weakened Solem's efficacy, leaving state courts
279 See id. at 70.
280 See People v. Andrade, No. FWV08781 (Cal. App. 1997), available at Joint
Appendix at 76, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
281 See Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of California, 270 F.3d 743, 758 (9th Cir. 2001).
282 See Butler v. McKeller, 494 U.S. 407,414 (1990).
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with a possibly dubious analytical structure to apply to proportionality
cases.2 83 Further, the state court demonstrated good faith when it applied
the state's equivalent of the Solem test yet still found Andrade's sentence to
be viable. 84 Finally, the AEPDA mandated that the state court's decision
must be unreasonable before a reviewing federal court could overturn it.
285
The state court reasonably relied on Rummel, which was good law, when it
analyzed Andrade's sentence.286 Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision
to reverse the Ninth Circuit was proper.
A close reading of Rummel and Solem underscores the difficult task
faced by the state court trying to apply the proportionality principle to
Andrade's sentence. As the previous cases have shown, the area of law
governing Eighth Amendment proportionality is anything but clear. 287 In
Solem, the Court emphasized that it did not overrule Rummel. 288 Because
the Solem Court went out of its way to affirm Rummel as good law, 289 the
majority opinion in Solem can be viewed as merely offering a framework
under which a court could review a sentence, should it determine the instant
sentence was one that merited proportionality review. 290  Interpreting
Rummel in his dissent in Solem, Chief Justice Burger asserted that Rummel
stood for the proposition that when developing sentencing schemes for
felonies, state legislatures were established in their primacy. 291 Thus, Solem
can be read as an attempt to standardize proportionality review, with a
dissent that re-emphasizes importance of legislative prerogatives. But this
conclusion is inconsistent with the Solem majority's assertion that "no
penalty is per se constitutional. 292  Therefore, distinguishing between
Rummel and Solem operationally as legal principles is almost impossible.
To better understand the difficulty of distinguishing between Rummel
and Solem, one must reject the notion that applying proportionality analysis
to a term-of-years sentence was a practice agreed on by both majorities. 293
283 See generally Barton C. Legum, Note, "Down the Road Toward Human Decency":
Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and Solem v. Helm, 18 GA. L. REv. 109 (1983).
284 See Joint Appendix at 77-78, Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of California, 270 F.3d 743 (9th
Cir. 2001) (No. 99-55691).
281 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2003).
286 Contra Andrade, 270 F.3d at 766. The Ninth Circuit declared that the state court's
decision to follow Rummel was unreasonable. Id.
287 See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72-73.
288 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 n.13, 303 n.32 (1983).
289 See id.
290 Id. at 290-92 (reviewing courts should be guided by objective factors).
291 Id. at 307.
292 id. at 290.
293 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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The majority in Rummel made one allowance for proportionality analysis
outside the death penalty context-parking tickets that carried a life
sentence as punishment-obviously an ad absurdum argument.294  The
majority based most of its reasoning on a utilitarian states rights
argument-states can deal in a harsher manner with those who chose not to
conform to societal norms.295 Further, courts applying Rummel thought it
eliminated proportionality analysis except in the absurd. 96  Such cases
indicate that the Rummel decision removed state sentencing decisions from
federal court review.297 Moreover, the Rummel dissent rejected utilitarian
analysis in favor of a fairness assessment encompassed in the
proportionality principle.298 Powell maintained that the Eight Amendment
should be used to ensure fairness in state sentencing. 299 Finally, Justice
Powell's dissent went through an extensive historical analysis to justify
proportionality review of non-capital sentences in Anglo-American law.
300
He engaged in this cataloging to show how the proportionality principle
should be applied.30 1 Therefore, the Supreme Court decision in Rummel
was understood to remove state imposed criminal sentences from federal
court review.
On the other hand, the majority opinion in Solem was written in a way
to debilitate the reasoning expressed in Rummel.3 2 Powell subjected all
sentences to proportionality review when he announced that no state
sentence carries a presumption of constitutionality.3 3 Additionally, the
analytic structure Powell used to evaluate the sentence in Solem was
rejected by Rummel as too subjective. 30 4 Moreover, the dissent in Solem
categorically rejects Powell's interpretation that Rummel announced an
acceptance of proportionality analysis applied to a term-of-years
sentence. 30 5 For the dissent in Solem, Rummel had actually dispelled the
294 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.I1 (1980).
295 See id. at 276.
296 See, e.g., Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 997, 1001 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(plurality opinion).
297 See id.
298 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
299 See id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
300 Id. at 288-93 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"' See id. at 293 (Powell, J., dissenting).
302 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 n.14 (1983) (asserting that unquestioned
legislative deference was not the standard adopted by the Court in Rummel).
303 See id. at 290.
304 Id. at 308.
311 Id. at 304-05.
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purported myth of proportionality.0 6 Ultimately, Rummel and Solem reflect
a fundamental difference in judicial philosophy. The Rummel Court
favored the view that state courts are co-equal with the federal court when
interpreting constitutional law, at least in the criminal realm. 30 7 The Solem
Court harkens back to the mistrust of state courts from the Warren era
decisions. 30 8 Therefore, these two cases must be read as mutually exclusive
in their reasoning yet occurring within three terms of each other. This left
lower courts with the difficult task of interpreting and applying both
because Solem did not overrule Rummel.3 °9
Two competing interpretative theories emerged in academia in an
attempt to reconcile the cases. 310 First, the cases could be read as setting
lines of demarcation that require a two tier analysis.31 1 Initially, a court
must determine whether the sentence is disproportionate (i.e., does it better
match the facts of Rummel or Solem).312 If Rummel governs on the facts,
then the sentence is constitutional and no further inquiry is needed. 31 3 On
the other hand, if a case matched Solem on the facts, then a court must
employ the subjective factors announced in that decision to determine the
sentence's constitutional viability.31 4 Unfortunately, this theory leaves a
gap where neither Rummel (life sentence with parole available in twelve
years) nor Solem (life sentence without parole) give clear instruction.315
This gap occurs where the sentence amounts to something less than life in
prison, or where the past crimes that caused application of the recidivist
statute carried a greater threat of violence than the instant crime (e.g., a
recidivist statute's application triggered by a car theft when the offender
had two previous convictions for armed robbery).316
Also, the cases could be read so that Solem eviscerated Rummel.
317
After all, Solem rejected the idea that any sentence is per se constitutionally
306 See id.
307 See generally Rehnquist, supra note 143.
308 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see Peter Arenella, Rethinking the
Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren & Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72
GEO. L.J. 185, 185 n.88 (1983).
309 Solem, 463 U.S. at 303 n.32, 298 n.13.
310 See generally Legum, supra note 283.
311 Seeid. at 134.
311 See id. at 130-31.
113 See id. at 130.
314 See id.; see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 40 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(recognizing a twilight zone between Solem and Rummel).
315 See Legum, supra note 283, at 131.
316 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
317 See Legum, supra note 283, at 132-33.
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valid.31 s  Moreover, Justice Powell took great pains to show how
proportionality was accepted under Anglo American law and as part of the
Eighth Amendment's jurisprudence. 319 He wanted to justify diverging from
the principle of legislative primacy that the Court had announced in
Rummel. 320 Finally, Solem asserted that judges can serve as good arbiters of
whether a sentence is disproportional.32' Powell dismissed Rummel's
assertion that proportionality was too subjective to be applied by the
judiciary.322 Therefore, reconciling these two cases, while yielding one
applicable legal principle, was exceedingly difficult.
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Harmelin attempted to harmonize the
two cases by distilling the fundamental principles underlying
proportionality analysis.323 He concluded that "[t]he Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather,
it forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the
crime. ' 324 His analysis focused on the severity of the crime in relation to
the sentence imposed.325 Kennedy then said that interjurisdictional and
intrajurisdictional comparisons should only be made on those rare occasions
in which the judge infers gross disproportionality between crime and
sentence.326 Thus, he adopted a two-tiered approach similar to the one
described at footnote 310 above.327 His approach was viewed as weakening
Solem. 328 Therefore, a state court applying proportionality analysis after
Harmelin could reasonably have thought that Solem's test was
questionable.
329
The Ninth Circuit tried to ascertain an employable distinction between
Rummel and Solem while entertaining Andrade's habeas petition. 330 The
court adopted Kennedy's Harmelin decision as the governing law. 331 It
318 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
319 See id. at 284-88.
320 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980).
321 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
322 See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281-82.
323 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998-1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., plurality
opinion). Kennedy's four principles are: (i) primacy of the state legislature; (ii) legitimacy
of variety in penalogical schemes; (iii) federalism; and (iv) the need for objectivity when
reviewing courts are assessing sentences. Id.
324 Id. at 1001 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 288, 303).
325 Id. at 1002-04.
326 Id. at 1005.
327 Id. at 1004-05.
321 See id. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting).
329 Contra Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of California, 270 F.3d 743, 766-67 (9th Cir. 2001).
330 Id. at 754-58.
331 Id. at 754.
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concluded that aspects of the Texas recidivist statute reviewed by the
Rummel Court informed as to why Solem had not overruled Rummel. 332 It
recognized that three factors in the Texas law had saved it from the
proportionality principle: (i) the requirement of separate convictions and
imprisonment for each felony; (ii) Texas's liberal parole policy; and (iii)
prosecutorial discretion in charging defendants under the statute.333 In order
to make a distinction between the cases based on these factors, the
discussion has to be ripped out of its context. A review of Rummel shows
that the factors of the Texas statute were not discussed at length to inform
as to constitutionally positive factors present in a recidivist statute. Instead,
the statute's factors were part of a larger discussion of how the petitioner's
argument that the Texas law was disproportionate when compared to other
jurisdictions erupted in an unending variable analysis. 334  Even if these
factors are employed to discern a distinction between Rummel and
Andrade's case, the Ninth Circuit ignores the fact that both the prosecutor
and the judge could dismiss the counts against Andrade. 335 Additionally,
the dissent in Rummel categorically rejected using probability of parole as a
validating instrument for proportionality analysis because a prisoner has no
constitutionally enforceable right to an early release from a legally imposed
sentence. 336 Thus, the Ninth Circuit gave no reason why the California
court should have followed Solem rather than Rummel.
Therefore, the Supreme Court properly reversed the Ninth Circuit. In
choosing to analyze Andrade's sentence under Rummel, the California
Court of Appeal had acted in good faith.337 By following Rummel, the state
court adopted the deferential doctrine announced by that decision.
338
Because Rummel remained good law, and the Harmelin decision had
weakened Solem, the state court's reliance on Rummel was reasonable.
339
Further, the Ninth Circuit was unable to show anything unreasonable about
the state court's adoption of Rummel. 340  Hence, the Lockyer decision
comports with AEDPA's reasonableness requirement.
332 Id.
333 Id. at 755 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 278-81 (1980)).
334 See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281.
335 See supra notes 42-43.
336 See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 294 (Powell J., dissenting). Justice Powell looks at parole
on a different basis in his majority opinion in Solem. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300
(1983) (noting parole is part of the rehabilitation process).
337 See Butler v. McKeller, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990).
338 See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 276.
339 People v. Andrade, No. FWV08781 (Cal. App. 1997), available at Joint Appendix at
76, Lockyer (No. 01-1127).
340 See supra text accompanying notes 330-36.
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Perhaps the most overlooked part of this ruling is what did not happen.
It bears mentioning that no one offered a concurrence to Justice O'Conner's
assertion that the proportionality principle is established in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. Even so, Lockyer affirms that the AEDPA's
limits on habeas review extend to the proportionality principle so that the
principle's application to state imposed sentences during federal court
review is limited to instances that are factually identical to Solem or so
absurd that they shock the conscience. 341  After Lockyer, a state court
performing proportionality analysis is free to compare a case to the facts of
Rummel when deciding it meets the threshold of gross disproportionality set
out in Harmelin.342 Therefore, the ruling in Lockyer guarantees that federal
court invocation of the proportionality principle is limited to absurd
instances, such as the example given in Rummel.343
B. THE COURT CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD THAT PROPORTIONALITY
REVIEW REQUIRES SUBSTANTIAL DEFERENCE TO THE STATES
The Lockyer Court properly found California's application of its own
law to be valid. The Court has traditionally recognized that dual
sovereignty in federalism results in experimentation by States.344 The Court
has also acknowledged that its actions should not inhibit such
experimentation in the States.345 California's three strikes law was a
prototype crafted to deal with recidivist criminals in that state.346 The law's
result was a sentence imposed on Andrade, a recidivist offender.3 47 Thus,
Andrade's sentence, because it is based on a law enacted by a state to deal
with crime in that state, deserves deference from a federal reviewing
court.
34 8
Indeed, one of the benefits of our federal system is diversity among the
States in deciding how to deal with social problems. 349 Admittedly, states
have purposed recidivist statutes to deter potential repeat offenders, and
341 See, e.g., Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11.
342 See Erwin Chemerinsky, October Term 2002, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 367, 372 (2003).
343 See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.1 1 (allowing for invalidation of a hypothetical state
law that would commit an offender to life in prison for a parking ticket).
344 See, e.g., Ker v. California 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963) (holding that states may develop
workable rules governing searches, seizures, and arrests as long as they do not run afoul of
the Fourth Amendment); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
345 See, e.g., New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
346 See Andriaz, supra note 30.
347 See supra text accompanying notes 204-10.




segregate from society those who will not conform to societal
expectations.35 ° California's treatment of petty theft as a "wobbler" subject
to progressively harsher treatment is no less rational than Texas treating
horse thieves more stringently than Rhode Island.35' In terms of
comparative review, a sentence resulting from a statutory scheme that
punishes an offender more harshly than would any of the other forty-nine
states does not necessarily mean the punishment is disproportionate to the
crime.352  Thus, because "our constitution 'is made for people of
fundamentally different views, ' 353 and three time offenders have
demonstrated their unwillingness to conform to societal norms, 354 California
has the right as a sovereign to segregate Andrade from the rest of society.
In Solem, the Court recognized the proposition that state legislatures
have broad authority to design punishments for crime in their
jurisdictions.355 California's three strikes law falls within that broad
discretion.356 Additionally, state courts that are imposing sentences under
authority granted by the legislature must be accorded substantial
deference. 357 The deference accorded legislatures is transmitted to the state
judiciary.358 Further, the fact that the Court has acknowledged invalidating
a twenty-five year sentence but not a fifteen year sentence shows how
difficult the proportionality principle is to operate. 359  Because of the
difficulty that courts face when making these subjective judgments, the
legislature is the best place for these decisions to be made. 360  Hence,
reviewing courts should grant substantial deference to States when
assessing whether a sentence is grossly disproportional.361
Instances of the Supreme Court overruling legislatively sanctioned
sentences, outside the death penalty context, are "exceedingly rare."
362
Indeed, only two such instances have occurred in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. The first was Robinson v. California,363 where the Court
350 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980).
351 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
352 See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281-82.
353 Id. at 282 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)).
354 Id. at 282 n.27.
355 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
356 See Andriaz, supra note 30.
317 Solem, 463 U.S. at 290.
358 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
319 Solem, 463 U.S. at 294.
360 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1980).
361 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
362 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272).
363 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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invalidated a California sentence of ninety days for the offense of being a
drug addict.364 The other was Solem. Moreover, legislatures are especially
equipped to deal with the subjective nature of the line drawing in this area
of proportionality, 365 whereas judicial action that overturns sentences
sanctioned by statute undermines public confidence in constitutional order
and the rule of law. 36 6 Passage of recidivist statutes such as the California
three strikes law seems to indicate a lack of public confidence in the
judiciary's ability, or perhaps willingness, to see to its protection. 367 As
much as such laws, and the sentences they impose, may be contrary to a
sitting judge's views on the goals of the criminal justice system, the
determination of those goals belongs to the legislative body.368 In other
words, the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle cannot be
employed to enforce contemporary views of crime and appropriate
punishment, denying States the ability to constitute a penalogical scheme
that fits the needs of the day. 369 Therefore, use of the proportionality
principle should be limited to those rare situations in which reasonable
minds cannot differ about the sentence imposed.370 Any other use of the
proportionality principle would be inimical to our federal order.371
Finally, the California three strikes law carries an even heavier
presumption of validity because it passed both the legislature and a ballot
initiative that went directly to the people.3 72 Proposition 184 garnered
seventy-two percent of the vote: a supermajority. 37 3 The ramifications of
implementing the law, such as imprisoning offenders like Andrade, had
been voiced to the public in the debate over Proposition 184. Thus, the
public knew what the likely results of the law were when they voted for it.
Moreover, the people of California are capable of correcting any perceived
'64 Id. at 667.
365 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275-76.
366 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 317-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 393 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting)).
367 See generally Mark Owens, Note, California's Three Strikes Law: Desperate Times
Require Desperate Measures-But Will It Work?, 26 PAC. L.J. 881 (1995)
368 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998-99 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citing Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)).
369 See id. at 990 (Scalia, J.).
370 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 311 n.3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
371 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 282 (1980).
372 See Morain & Ellis, supra note 23.
373 See id.
374 See, e.g., John Balzer, The Target: Repeat Offenders, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1994, at
A5 (noting the sentence of a petty thief under another state's three strikes law).
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inequity created by situations like Andrade's. 375 Discussions to recalibrate
the three strikes provision are under way.376 Thus, California, and not the
United States Supreme Court, is capable of reforming its own penal law to
fit its needs. Therefore, the Supreme Court should defer to the State, and
allow its experimentation to wind its course.
377
C. THE COURT FOLLOWED CONGRESSIONAL INTENT WHEN IT
ASSESSED THE STATE COURT UNDER A DEFERENTIAL STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The Lockyer Court upheld the California court ruling because AEDPA
required deference to the state court.3 78 The majority in Congress intended
to radically reshape habeas review. 379  The testimony heard by
congressional committees alerted members to how the new standard of
review would substantially alter habeas proceedings in federal courts. 380
Moreover, the reasonableness language was inserted into the AEDPA
specifically to "respect[] the coordinate role of the States in our
constitutional structure." 381 Since the drastic changes the AEPDA would
bring about for habeas proceedings were part of the open debate in
Congress, 382 the Court properly deferred to the California Court of Appeal
when it applied precedent and found Andrade's sentence to be within
constitutional strictures.383 Indeed, the Court anticipated the unsuccessful
375 See, e.g., Carl Ingram, Two Campaigns Bid to Ease Three Strikes, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2002, at B 1.
376 See id.
377 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
378 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72-77 (2003).
379 See generally 141 CONG. REC. H4086-4121 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (debating the
need for habeas reform).
380 See, e.g., Senate Habeas Hearing, supra note 150, at 196 (statement of Prof. Larry
Wackle on behalf of the American Bar Association).
381 141 CONG. REC. H4112 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (discussing
his reasons for changing the standard of review that federal courts must accord to state court
decisions).
312 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7965 (daily ed. April 18, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Berman) (discussing the preexisting standard of review in habeas proceedings and
recognizing that the AEDPA would significantly alter that standard).
383 See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (affirming Andrade's sentence was not an unreasonable
application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent).
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result of applying the proportionality principle under the AEDPA before the
Lockyer case was ever decided.384
Important ideas about our constitutional structure underlay passage of
the AEDPA. One such notion is efficient allocation of limited judicial
resources, which was the cornerstone of this reform.385 Federal judges have
increasingly full dockets, and should not serve as courts that retry criminal
cases.386 Additionally, the lion's share of the cost of federal habeas review
is born by the State.387 Among these costs are the extended litigation a
State must face at the Federal level, the uncertainty or delay in enforcement
of its laws against criminal defendants, costs of retrial if a sentence is
overturned, and the comity among dual sovereigns that does not honor good
faith effort by State courts to enforce constitutional norms.388  The
reasonableness language in the AEDPA strikes a proper balance between
states' interests in protecting their citizenry, allocating their judicial
resources, and maintaining a baseline of constitutional rights accorded to all
convicts. 389 Additionally, the AEDPA codified reforms set in motion by the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts. 390 The Act is a major turn away from the
Warren court era use of habeas to enforce new criminal procedure rights on
state judges.39' Therefore, the AEDPA's history and language ensures
Lockyer was decided in line with congressional intent to limit habeas.392
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court ruling in Lockyer clarifies application of the
Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle in post-AEDPA habeas
review. A narrow proportionality principle exists, and should only be
employed to overturn a State imposed sentence permitted by a statutory
384 See id. (noting several justices' requests that the Court accept a direct challenge of
California's three strikes provision because of the uncertain implications of AEDPA
standard of review).
385 See Powell Committee Report, supra note 153; see generally Rehnquist, supra note
143.
386 See generally supra note 149.
387 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 738-39 (1991).
388 See id. at 738-39, 748.
389 See 141 CONG. REc. H4112 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox); see also
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) (holding that petitioner's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim was cognizable as a federal habeas claim because the Virginia Supreme
Court had unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, the governing precedent).
390 See Smith, supra note 146, at 1069-77.
"' See id. at 1065-69.
392 Cf Friedman, supra note 147 (cataloging the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' attempts
at habeas reform based on notions of states rights and federalism).
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scheme in extreme circumstances. Many reasons for such a high level of
deference to states underlay the Court's ruling. Chief among those is
congressional intent, expressed in the standard of review for federal habeas
proceedings, ensconced in the AEDPA. Because of the ambiguity in
Supreme Court precedent regarding the proportionality principle and the
language of the AEDPA, the California Court of Appeal was free to choose
among the competing doctrines about the role of proportionality in
sentencing. Additionally, judicial economy and ideas of federalism require
deference to state court decisions. The California three strikes law is a
legitimate exercise of state sovereignty, and sentences meted out according
to its provisions deserve respect, despite judges' feelings about the outcome
of the statute. Finally, the Lockyer decision reflects a broader notion that
state courts, after a half century of tutoring by federal courts on the proper
application of criminal constitutional rights, have sufficiently matured to
become coequal interpreters of constitutional law.
Doyle Horn
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